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I. INTRODUCTION
One obvious reason that comprehensive and speedy privatiza-
tion in Russia has encountered serious economic, social, and
political problems is that a private enterprise system can hardly
prosper within a centrally-planned economy. The Russian
economy was pushed into the process of privatization prematurely.
It is becoming clear that privatization will not be successful unless
other fundamental economic reforms are also undertaken. Several
factors contribute to the initial demonopolization' and decentral-
ization of the national economy: (1) eliminating government
control; (2) abolishing ministers and agencies; (3) instituting a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Sverdlovsk Law Institute, Yekaterinburg, Russia.
Jurist 1989, Sverdlovsk Law Institute, Yekaterinburg, Russia; Jurist-Scientist 1992, the
Urals Academy of Law, Yekaterinburg, Russia; L.L.M. 1994, UCLA Law School; J.S.D.
1994, Stanford University School of Law.
1. Some authors believe that successful privatization requires privatized firms to
operate in a competitive environment. See, e.g., JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW,
PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988) (citing privatization efforts in the
United Kingdom); see also STANLEY FISCHER, PRIVATIZATION IN EAST EUROPEAN
TRANSFORMATION 3 (May 1991) (Working Paper No. 3703, on file with the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.) (stating that "demonopolization should precede
privatization").
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banking system before privatization;2 (4) reforming trade to
encourage competition and export; (5) establishing legal incentives
for foreign investors;3 (6) reducing barriers to foreign trade;4 (7)
reforming prices and liberalizing the market; (8) permitting private
ownership rights to land; (9) enacting legal reforms to ensure
proper disclosure; (10) developing bankruptcy, tax, and antitrust
legislation;5 and (11) enforcing contracts and due process. Rather
than implementing these steps, the Russian President and Parlia-
ment, both accustomed to administrative remedies, instituted
another government plan-the Program of Privatization.6 In a
sense, this Program reflects the entire range of theories about
privatization. Accordingly, the Program includes different
approaches to the transfer of state property to the private sector.
One of the fundamental obstacles to the development of a
market economy in Russia, and other former Soviet republics, is
a failure to recognize the concept of private land.7 Historically,
Soviet land law failed to provide incentives for developing land
and increasing production of agricultural commodities. A report
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development found
that some twenty-eight percent of all grain and as much as fifty-
percent of all potatoes produced in the former Soviet Union were
simply lost before reaching consumers.' Perhaps these losses can
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. BRAINARD, STRATEGIC FOR ECONOMICAL TRANSFORMA-
TION IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL REFORM (1990) (on file with the
Bankers Trust Company).
3. Foreign Participation in Russian Privatization Must Deal With Various Obstacles,
3 RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP. No. 21, Mar. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
4. EDUARDO BORENSZTEIN & MANMOHAN S. KUMAR, 38 PROPOSALS FOR
PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 319 (1991) (on file with International Monetary
Fund).
5. See, e.g., V.K. Mautov, Pravovoe obespechenie uslovii dlia razvitia sorevnovania
v economike [Legal Guarantees of Conditions for Developing Competition in Economics],
6 SoV. Gos. I PRAVO 56-64 (1992) (discussing the developing Russian anti-monopoly
legislation).
6. Generally, annual State Programs of Privatization have to be considered and
approved by the Government of the Russian Federation and passed by the Russian
Parliament-the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The Programs establish
methods of privatization, including units and enterprises subject to compulsory
transformation of ownership rights.
7. Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Exchanges and the
Privatization of the Agricultural Sector in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Needed
Steps in Creating a Market Economy, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 144 (1992).
8. Id. at n.184 (citing to Half Soviet Potatoes Never Reach Consumers, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1991, at 7).
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be explained by "the absence of private property, which means
people regard state property and goods as 'belonging to no one.''9
Accordingly, the privatization of state agricultural farms and
collectives might resolve the problems of production and supply of
agricultural goods. Privatization of property, however, may not
resolve all existing problems of the Russian agricultural complex.
The Soviet civil law model of absolute ownership is inconsistent
with the public policy goal of increasing farming efficiency. The
''giving away" scheme can deliver the land to the wrong person for
the wrong purposes. Privatization gives rise to. corruption and
money laundering. An economic gap exists between the "new
rich" in Russia and the working people of the former Soviet
republics. The affluence of the new rich results from the weakness
in the law and its administration, rather than hard work and
business competition.' ° Rudimentary ecological legislation now
in effect does not protect natural resources and land from harmful
contamination. Inflation, coupled with government restructuring,
encourages corruption." Land can be bought practically dirt-
cheap and kept fallow for many years until inflation is curbed
because the commercial value of the land is much higher than its
agricultural value. 2 Such privatization does not serve the public
interest.
This Article offers an historical review of the predominance
of state property in Russia. It describes Russia's policies of
collectivization, and its early concepts of land privatization. This
Article then reviews existing land legislation and land reforms in
Russia, and demonstrates the fundamental issues that have been
left unresolved by these laws and reforms. Finally, this Article
outlines the development of a substantive program to realize
privatization and reconstruction of state farming.
Privatization in Russia resembles the children's game of
musical chairs. Everybody walks around the chairs and waits until
9. Id.
10. After Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree guaranteeing Russians the
right to buy and sell land, Yuri D. Chemichenko, leader of the Farmer's Party, stated:
"There are 12 million peasants in Russia, and all of them have become wealthy in just one
day." Sonni Efron, Yeltsin Signs Guarantees of Private Land Ownership, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1993, at Al, A16.
11. Fred Kaplan, Russians Are Able to Trade Land Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28,
1993, (National/Foreign), at 1 (describing the corrupt practices of Russian businesses).
12. This was a popular argument by the collective farm lobby against land privatiza-
tion. Id.
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the music stops, indicating that they may sit down. Unfortunately,
players outnumber the chairs, and a player left without a chair is
out of the game. This game differs from the process of land
privatization in Russia only because under the old Soviet system,
all the "chairs" were already allotted to members of the Commu-
nist Party and the bureaucratic elite. Some citizens had no chance
to win in the first place. Under a privatized system of land
ownership, when the music stops and everyone is allowed to "sit,"
not everybody will have a "seat."
This Article will discuss two possible solutions to the problems
of land privatization in Russia. First, this Article will suggest that
Russia should not privatize everything, and it should not distribute
property to everybody. The government must maintain the
discretion to choose which land to privatize and who will receive
it, thereby limiting the scope of privatization. Second, this Article
will argue that the traditional civil law approach to the right of
absolute ownership must be reformed, and the state's undivided
property interest should be split into estates. The state can
transfer title on land to a farmer for the limited purposes of
agricultural activity but still reserve the right to regain the
ownership to the land in the event of waste. This system allows
the state to designate the use of land for specific purposes
pursuant to public policy, while also giving the owners a broad
system of powers to possess, use, manage and control the land.
II. STATE PROPERTY AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF LAND IN
RUSSIA: HISTORICAL REVIEW
Prior to the October Revolution of 1917 and the First World
War, Russia "ranked first among all of the nations of the world in
quantity of production and export of wheat, and was second only
to the United States in the total production of cereals." 3 Despite
this success, the tradition of private farming was not well estab-
lished in Tsarist Russia. Russian land was not owned by individu-
als, but by peasant communal farms, known as mirs.14
13. SCOTT NEARING & JACK HARDY, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE
SOVIET UNION 47 (Jerome Davis ed., 1927).
14. Later, both Karl Marx and Friedreich Engels believed that the institution of the
mir contained "the germ of socialism," and Josef Stalin starved millions of peasants to
implement that collectivist vision in the 1930's. See, e.g., Efron, supra note 10, at A16.
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State property in Russia is derived from the property of
princes, tsars and sovereigns; the difference between the tsar's
family property and state property, or fiscal property, was
gradually introduced into practice and implemented by law.'5
For example, the Edict On The Imperial Family of 1797
established a special type of property-the appanage estates
("udelnii imenija ,).16 These appanage estates were recognized as
the private property of the Imperial Family and other members of
the Imperial House, and were separated from the fund of the state,
or fiscal property.17 According to this novation the land, which
did not belong to anybody in particular, was considered the
property of the Tsar, and fell under the jurisdiction of the state
treasury.18 For instance, as the new lands became the territorial
acquisitions of Russia, they became the property of the state, and
not of the Imperial Family.
The idea of state ownership of land is not merely a theoretical
product of communist ideology and Stalin's collectivization. Pre-
revolutionary Russia was primarily agricultural, with an established
history of state ownership of land. 9 In 1893, the Tsar's Minister
of Finance, Count Vitte, stated in his report to the Tsar on land
reforms:
"In our fatherland, because of the specific historical conditions
which the Russian state has formatted and developed, a market
economy cannot restrict itself within strictly defined boundaries,
which are pre-established according to the state's needs in the
generally accepted meaning of the word. The Russian people
have a deep notion, rooted in their feelings and their minds,
that everything, including a concern about the well-being and
needs of the people, springs from the power of the Tsar."'
15. Rafail Nasirov, Opredelenie gosudarstvennoi sobstvennosti v Rossiiskom
dorevoluzionnom zakonodatelstve [Definition of State Property in Pre-Revolutionary
Russian Legislation], in AKTUALNII PROBLEMI PRAVOVEDENUA NA SOVREMENNOM
ETAPE [ACTUAL PROBLEMS WITH AUTHORITY OF THE LAW AT THE PRESENT STAGE]
12 (Sverdlovsk Law Institute ed., 1992).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. NEARING & HARDY, supra note 13, at 47.
20. L. B. HODSKY, OSNOVI GOSUDARSTVENNOGO HOZIAJSTVA [FUNDAMENTALS OF
THE NATION'S ECONOMY] 43 (Saint Petersburg, 1894).
1994]
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According to Count Vitte, whose impact on the development
of Russian history is arguable,2" the Russian people did not need
private ownership of land because they had faith in the Tsar and
his discretion to use the land for the necessities of the state, as well
as for the benefit and needs of the people themselves.22 This was
an official state policy of Tsarist Russia.' Vitte's ideas about the
unique quality of the formation and development of the Russian
state were later adopted and expanded by the Slavophiles. Some
of the Slavophiles included famous Russian literary figures, critics,
and scientists who advanced the unique "slavic way" of developing
Russia.24
According to the general census of 1905, the state owned
thirty-eight percent of all agricultural lands and sixty percent of all
forests in the European section of Russia.2 The majority of state
lands, however, were enormous spaces in Eastern and Northern
Russia that were apparently not included in the 1905 census.
26
Though it is clear that state ownership of property was dominant
in pre-revolutionary Russia, the percentage of Russian land that
was under state ownership remains uncertain.
Pre-revolutionary Russia also faced problems with effective
management of the huge expanse of state lands. The Russian
government, from the beginning of the nineteenth century,
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The idea of a "unique Slavic way" is far from dying, even in our time. Two
prominent Western economists, Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University and Anders Aslund
of the Stockholm School of Economics, served as advisors to the Russian government on
its free-market reforms. In January 1994, they resigned in despair over the anti-reform
attitude of the new cabinet. Russian Prime-Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin responded
to the resignations by stating that he did not believe in using foreign advisors. His
spokesman, Valentin Sergeyev, told reporters that Russia's reform "naturally takes into
account world experience in market economics, but its pivot is the reality of the Russian
state, its traditions, an understanding of the country's specifics and the mentality of
Russians." Carey Goldberg, Western Advisers Quit to Protest Russia Policy, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1994, at A6.
25. Rafail Nasirov, Opit privatizazii gosudarstvennih zemel v gubernijah evropejskoy
rossii v 1906-1917gg [The Experience of Privatization of State Lands in the Provinces of
European-Russia 1906-1917], in AKTUALNII VOPROSI SOVERSHENSTVOVANIYA
ZAKONODATELSTVA I PRAKTIKA EGO REALIZAZII [ACTUAL QUESTIONS OF PERFECTING
LEGISLATION AND THE PRACTICABILITY OF ITS REALIZATION] 79, 80 (Sverdlovsk Law
Institute ed., 1992).
26. See, e.g., D. A. TARASUK, POZEMELNAYA SOBSTVENNOST POREFERMENNOI
Rossil [TRANSLATION] 69 (Profizdat Moskva ed., 1981).
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endeavored to create appropriate conditions for developing small
private farms. The Edict of 1801 initiated the process of privatiz-
ing state lands.27 The Edict gave merchants, the petty bourgeois,
and the free peasants the right to purchase state lands.' None-
theless, the slowly forming private ownership relations became an
obstacle to the development of bourgeois economic relations.
The Land Reform of 1961 was famous for its legal abolition
of landlord property rights. Nonetheless, tens of millions of
peasants remained without their own land. The government,
pursuing its own fiscal and policy interests, did not want to
annihilate the peasants' communes. The government's action
explains why owners of the purchased lands were not individual
peasants but rather the communes themselves. The peasants could
not demand their own share of the land upon leaving the com-
mune. Furthermore, the peasants were allotted their parcels of
land only temporarily, and each time in different places. Clearly,
such an organization of agriculture did not promote efficient
farming. The peasants had no incentive to invest their labor and
capital in the land.
Reithern, the Tsar's Minister of Finance,29 an advocate of
private ownership and an opponent of the state-based economy,
established a policy allowing minimum state intervention in the
economic sphere.3" During this time, state-built railroads were
being transferred to private associations.31 Privatization also
extended to state-owned factories, plants, and fiscal lands.
32
The First Russian Revolution of 1905 forced the government
to take serious steps to extend the availability of private farm
lands.33 The Stolipin Land Reform signaled the transition from
government policy to the concept of private farming.' It was the
most significant attempt to resolve the so-called "land question" in
pre-revolutionary Russia.35
27. The peasants received this right only by The Edict of the 3d of March, 1848.
Nasirov, supra note 25, at 20.
28. Id.
29. Mr. Reithern served as Minister of Finance from 1862-1878.
30. Nasirov, supra note 15, at 13.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id.
33. Nasirov, supra note 25, at 80.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., id.
19941
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The Edict of the 27th of August, 1906, promoted the develop-
ment of individual agricultural farms in Russia.36 Interestingly,
only arable lands were sold off, while the lands of churches,
schools, state factories, plants, and other organizations were
excluded from the sale.37 The state's arable lands were sold to
individual farmers, cooperatives, agricultural associations, and
peasant communes. 38 The price of the land was determined by
the Peasants' Land Bank, according to the average profitability of
the particular parcel.39 The state's arable lands could be bought
on credit with only a small down-payment (3.02% of the full
price), and the balance could be paid by annual installments during
a period ranging between 13 to 55.5 years.' Notably, an initial
lease of the state land was a prerequisite to purchase.4" Only
after the expiration of the lease could title to the parcel of land be
transferred to the peasant.42 Another condition precedent to the
land purchase required the prospective owner to move to the
land. 3 Land certificates were prepared and notarized only after
these conditions were fulfilled.
The process of privatization was administered by specially
created commissions, which included representatives of the
Peasants' Land Bank, a local administration, judges, government,
agents, and public delegates." The alienation of state lands,
however, did not occur on a massive scale. By January 1, 1912,
only 9,351 land-purchase transactions were completed, privatizing
approximately 156,000 dessiatinas of state-owned land (421,200
acres).45
36. Ukaz 0 prednaznachenii Kazennih zemel k prodazhe dija Raschereniya
Krestiyanskogo Zemlepolzovaniya [Edict on the Earmarking of Public Lands for Sale to
Extend Peasant Land Use] art. 1399, 210 Sbornik Ukazov (1906).
37. Nasirov, supra note 25, at 81.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 81-82.
42. Id. at 82.
43. Id.
44. Ukaz ot 4 marta 1906 goda ob uchrezhdenii: a) Komiteta po zemleustroitelnim
Delam pri Glavnom Upravlenii Zemleustrojstva i Zemledalija i b) Gubernskie i Uezdnie
Zemleustroitelnii Komisii [Decree of March 4, 1906 of the Organization of a) the
Committee on Land Development for Construction and Agriculture Management, and b)
Commissions on the Subdivision of Provinces and Townships] art. 307,48 Sbornik Ukazov
(1906).
45. Nasirov, supra note 25, at 80.
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The October Revolution of 1917 resulted in the abolition of
landlord property rights and the nationalization of lands previously
belonging to the Imperial Family, the government, and local
municipalities. One famous Bolshevik slogan proclaimed, "The
land to the peasants," and one of the first of Lenin's decrees, "The
Decree On Land," provided that peasants were the true owners of
the land in their possession without the necessity of any further
payments.'
The Russian Civil War, the counter-revolution, and foreign
intervention by several industrial countries simultaneously, and on
different fronts, dramatically deteriorated the situation in Russia
after the October Revolution. During this crucial period,
Vladimir Lenin proposed a policy of "war communism," originally
conceived as a temporary measure.'8 The Bolsheviks abolished
private grain trade and sought grain from the peasants as a loan to
the state in order to fight inflation and mass starvation, as well as
to provide war supplies and to keep the factories working.4 9
Indeed, Lenin considered the food suppliers' problem to be the
factor that determined the survival of the country, especially when
the poor harvest of 1918 aggravated the situation.5" Facing
sabotage by the prosperous and middle-class peasants who were
not willing to give their grain away for non-secured government
promises of reimbursement, the Bolsheviks adopted extraordinary
measures of forced grain requisitions." These measures were
aimed at eliminating speculation in grain and partially resolving
the food problem. Nonetheless, the peasants responded to the
government's actions by slashing production to levels that met only
their own needs and sheltered the grain to sell on the black
46. See, e.g., RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 40 (1951).
47. See, e.g., W. BRUCE LINCOLN, RED VICTORY: A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN
CIVIL WAR (1989).
48. The Bolsheviks instituted the program of "war communism" in an attempt to
eliminate private enterprise through the nationalization of land, industry, and banks.
Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 124. Trade was brought under strict government
control and industry was subject to wholesale nationalization. E. A. REES, STATE
CONTROL IN SOVIET RUSSIA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET WORKERS' AND
PEASANTS' INSPECTORATE, 1920-34, at 15 (1992).
49. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 124.
50. SILVANA MALLE, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF WAR COMMUNISM, 1918-
1921, at 338-80 (1985).
51. Id.
1994]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
market.52 During the period of "war communism," agricultural
production fell to a level of approximately three-fourths of the
1912 production level.53
After the civil war and foreign intervention, the Bolshevik
government faced the problem of rehabilitating the national
economy. The system of "war communism" became an obstacle
to the development of agricultural production.54 Furthermore,
the widespread dissatisfaction of peasants with the policy of forced
grain requisitions aggravated the political situation.55 The over-
whelming majority of Red Army soldiers were peasants who
returned to their farms after the wars.56 The Bolsheviks had no
choice but to unite with the peasants to form their broad political
base. In March 1992, at the Tenth Congress of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin proposed a so-
called New Economic Policy ("NEP").57 The peasants were given
tenancy of the land as long as they kept it cultivated.58 Instead
of forced grain requisitions, the peasants were taxed initially "in-
kind"-that is, in grain. All grain produced in excess of the tax
could be sold on the free market, creating an incentive for
increased production.59
The NEP brought civil peace, political stability, and economic
recovery.6° In fact, while the NEP was in effect, the economy
recovered and agriculture production was restored to pre-war
levels.61 Unfortunately, one will never know how the course of
history might have been changed had the Bolsheviks kept this
economic policy as a fundamental principle. The turning point of
Russian history was the death of Vladimir Lenin, who, in his final
years, became convinced that a market exchange and commodity,
52. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 125.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., PETER J. BOETrKE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVIET SOCIALISM:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1918-1928, at 114 (1990); VLADIMIR DMITRENKO,
ECONOMICHESKAY POLITIKA POSTROENIYA SOCIALIZMA V SSSR [ECONOMIC POLICY
DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR] 46 (1987).
58. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 125.
59. Id.
60. STEPHEN F. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY, 1888-1938, at 273 (1971).
61. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 128.
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or money-based relations system was preferable to heavy state
domination over the entire economy, at least with regard to mid-
size and small enterprises. 2
Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, decided that collectivization
was needed to liquidate the kulaks, or rich farmers, as a class.63
Large, private farms reminded Stalin of the capitalist, pre-revolu-
tionary country.6 Indeed, private ownership of land was neces-
sary to the development of a market, which was an alien concept
to communist ideology.65  In this way, wide-spread general
collectivization began.66 The wealthy and middle-class peasants
who resisted collectivization were arrested and exiled to Siberia.
Their lands, estates, chattels, and equipment were confiscated.
"Private trade... became a crime, punished as 'speculation' with
a sentence of five to ten years in a labor camp and loss of proper-
ty."'67 This action was contrary to the NEP's most fundamental
principle: the right of the peasants to manage their own farms and
sell grain freely.' Collectivization resulted in severe famine,
terror, and mass murders,69 as well as the aggravation of agricul-
tural production problems.70
The idea of collectivization itself was primarily political. The
NEP showed that a socialist economy could successfully survive
alongside private farming, free market relations, free trade, and
62. After Lenin's death, almost all of his last works about new economic changes
toward a market economy were concealed from the public. This concealment is explained
in part by Stalin's fear of publicity of his ideological disagreements with Lenin. Lenin had
demanded that the Central Committee of the Communist Party reconsider Stalin's
candidacy for the post of General Secretary.
63. RONALD HINGLEY, JOSEPH STALIN: MAN AND LEGEND 204-05 (1974).
64. Id.
65. According to Trotsky, one of Lenin's opponents, "the socialist organization of the
economy begins :with the liquidation of the market." RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION 698 (1990).
66. Hingley, supra note 63, at 205.
67. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 127.
68. Id.
69. Id. According to some sources, collectivization caused ten million deaths in the
1930's. These deaths were primarily due to starvation and repressions. See e.g., Fred
Kaplan, supra note 11 at 1.
70. See, e.g., MICHAEL MIRSKI, THE MIXED ECONOMY NEP AND ITS LOT 213-30
(Rosenkilde & Bagger ed., 1984); see also Hingley, supra note 63, at 204.
1994]
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commodity exchanges. 71 No clear economic need to reform
agricultural organization existed.
Both objective and subjective causes contributed to inade-
quate food supplies. First, the entire national economy was
depressed as a result of the nine-year period during the First
World War, the Russian Civil War and foreign intervention in
Russia.72 The overwhelming majority of peasants left the land to
go into military service, and many never returned.73 The most
favorable farm lands for agricultural production in Russia were
occupied by enemies and produced no harvests for a long time.74
Second, agricultural production in Russia largely depends on
climatic conditions. Poor harvests in the late 1920's and early
1930's resulted from bad weather. Finally, peasants had no
incentives for rational and efficient management. Historically, they
were unaccustomed to being private owners and did not yet have
"roots" in their land.
The main goal of collectivization was not to increase grain
supplies in order to feed urban workers, as has been asserted by
some authors.75 Rather, the socialization of the country and the
liquidation of such alien class elements as kulaks was the primary
goal.76 Even in periods of poor harvests and insufficient availabil-
ity of grain for human consumption, the Soviets exported grain to
acquire badly needed foreign currency.7 Certainly, Russia was
able to feed itself, and for the most part, it did.
The stated goal of collectivization was to replace the farm with
an "agro-industrial complex."' Farmers became workers; they
were housed in apartment blocks, worked seven-hour shifts, and
received monthly salaries-just like factory workers.79 This
71. According to the image-laden expression of an historian, the NEP "set the wheels
going again and the chimneys smoking by the stimulus it gave to private production, small
in units but vast in volume, and to private trade." Hans Schmidt, Housing Problems, in
RED ECONOMICS 225-46 (Gerhard Dobbert ed., 1932).
72. See, e.g., Pipes, supra note 65, at 698-99.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 144.
76. Hingley, supra note 63, at 204-05.
77. M. M. Kostecki, The Soviet Union in International Grain Markets, in THE SOVIET
IMPACr ON COMMODITY MARKETS 202 (M. M. Kostecki ed., 1984).
78. Elisabeth Rubinfien, Russia Moves to Dismantle Collective Farming System, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 27, 1993, at A16.
79. Id.
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system failed miserably. Since the 1970's, the Soviet Union has
generally imported about fifteen percent of its annual grain
needs.'
Significant attempts to improve agricultural production after
Stalin's death all failed because they did not change the basis of
agricultural production--ownership of the land."1 "Ever since the
collectivization in the early 1930's, agriculture has been an
outstanding weakness of the Soviet economy. No other branch
appears so riddled with economic absurdities . . . ."'
In the 1980's, Soviet economists seriously considered introduc-
ing market elements, such as those used during the NEP period,
into the national economy. Mikhail Gorbachev advocated a
brigade system of workers for collective farms, with payment based
on results.8 3 Presumably, such incentives would increase produc-
tivity.' Gorbachev also proposed imposition of a food tax
derived from a similar tax used by Vladimir Lenin during the NEP
period.' Under this proposal, state production quotas were set,
and the collectives were allowed to sell the excess.8 Thus, the
income of the collectives became tied to their production without
changing their essential social nature.87 The Communist Party's
Central Committee adopted Gorbachev's proposals for land leasing
arrangements in the agricultural sector.88 These restructuring
efforts, however, did not disturb a fundamental object of the
centralized socialist economy-communal ownership of the means
of production, including land. The collective farms still predomi-
80. Id.
81. For example, Nikita Kruschev sought to cultivate the "virgin lands" in Kazakhstan.
Several efforts were made to improve the material and technical basis of collective farms.
RAYMOND HUTCHINGS, SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 121 (2d ed. 1982);
ELLSWORTH RAYMOND, THE SOVIET STATE 163 (2d ed. 1978); RONALD J. HILL, THE
SOVIET UNION, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY FROM LENIN TO GORBACHEV 26
(1985).
82. ANDERS ASLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM 96(1989).
83. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 7, at 130.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., MIKHAEL S. GORBACHEV, AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY 158 (Donald
Morrison ed., 1988).
88. See, e.g., OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA: AN INSIDER'S
VIEW 228-45 (1989).
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nated in the country,89 and agricultural production remained
abysmal.9°
The following conclusions may be drawn from this brief
historical review: (1) state ownership of land predominated in
Russia, even before the October Revolution of 1917; (2) historical-
ly, the practice of private farming was not fully developed in
Russia; (3) nationalization of land and state ownership of land are
not distinguishing characteristics of the social and economic
structure of socialism, but are products of Stalin's model of
socialism;91 and (4) the means of production in the Soviet Union's
agricultural-industrial complex, which was based on the collective
organization of labor on state-owned lands, proved to be a failure.
III. LAND LEGISLATION AND LAND REFORMS IN RUSSIA:
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
A complete discussion of the problems and perspectives of
privatization of land in Russia must include the development of
Russian land legislation, since it reflects the evolution of Russian
89. At the end of 1993, less than four percent of Russian farmland was private, and
all 184,000 of those family farms were created in the last three years. Efron, supra note
10, at A16. Private family farms occupied 16.3 million acres of agricultural land, small
household farms had 13.6 million acres, and state or collective farms held 385.3 million
acres. Rubinfien, supra note 78, at A16. In comparison, the entire land mass of the
United States is 2,271,343,360 acres, but only about thirty percent of that-some 662.1
million acres-is owned by the federal government. About one percent of the total land
is owned by either foreign countries or foreign nationals; the rest is owned by U.S. citizens.
Irene Ertugrul, Mixture of Hope and Pessimism Seen in New Russian Land Policy, WE
(Russia), Nov. 15-28, 1993, at 3.
90. Food production in the former Soviet Union has been dropping at an annual rate
of ten to twelve percent. Francis X. Clines, 10 Soviet Republics Agree to Coordinate Food
Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A5.
91. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the collectivization was merely a
product of Stalin's political imagination and was compelled by the government as an
administrative measure, rather than an economic necessity. The NEP evidently proved
that land, as private property, could successfully coexist with the elements of socialist
planning and a restricted state monopoly with regard to certain key activities, such as
transportation, communication, banking, military-defense, and large industry. In fact, some
Eastern European countries, such as Poland, have never abolished private land ownership.
State control over production, if needed, can be accomplished by other methods that are
more productive than ownership, such as contract, taxation, splitting of ownership rights
or fiduciary relations. For this reason, China and Communist Vietnam are working toward
capitalism, which they officially call "a socialist market economy." Indeed, that may be
the practical answer for countries unwilling to admit "their wish to abandon the
disadvantages of a planned economy for the rewards of individual initiative." Arlen
Specter, Capitalism's March in Asia, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1994, at A12.
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land policy. The concept of land ownership still is developing in
Russia, as reflected in the "profusion and proliferation of its land
laws."'  On the other hand, the established traditions in legisla-
tion, for better or worse, affect the development of political and
economic consciousness. Understanding the major legal issues of
Russian land law, or at least its general principles, is helpful in
analyzing the current problems of land ownership in Russia.
First, Russian property law originated in the branch of
continental law, which is derived from Roman civil law.9 The
major difference between the concepts of ownership in common
law and civil law is the absolute character of ownership rights
under civil law, as opposed to a "splintered" or "compound-
structural" model of ownership under common law.' The
"possessory estates," "fiduciary ownership," or "trusts," recognized
in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, have no direct counterparts in
continental or civil law. Indeed, civil law basically deals with the
movement of objects of ownership but not with abstract intangible
rights, such as "fee simple," "fee tail," or "life estate." According-
ly, the operation of Anglo-American common law has been
described as follows:
The development of the fee simple estate is an example of that
most striking phenomenon of English law, the reunification of
abstractions, a process of thinking that still pervades our law.
Instead of thinking of the land itself, the lawyer thinks of an
estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a real
existence apart from the land. 95
In contrast, Russian lawyers think first about the object of
ownership itself--ownership that represents certain absolute rights.
The rule is simple: one object of ownership, one right of owner-
ship. The socialist-communist doctrines inevitably left their mark
on the development of civil law in Russia after the socialist
revolution. Land was basically withdrawn from commodity-money
exchange in Russia for several generations. Under the Communist
regime, people were not permitted to own land privately; thus,
land could not be purchased and sold. Consequently, the Russian
92. Olga Floroff & Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Land Ownership In the Russian Federation:
Laws and Obstacles, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235 (1993).
93. Janis Rozenfelds, Latvia: Legislation and Denationalisation of Land, 67 LAW INST.
J. 358-59 (1993).
94. Id.
95. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 206 (3d ed. 1993).
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concept of land ownership differs significantly from the Western
concept.
Some well-known principles of socialist land law include:
1. Community ownership of land. The ownership of land was
legally vested in "the community." As a practical matter, those
with political power controlled the land. Usually the state's
position was considered analogous to the monarch in feudal
English law.' The federal structure of the Soviet Union and
Russia itself also complicated the process of allotting lands
between the Federation, the Republics, and the regions.
2. Ambiguous and uncertain title. The concept "property of
the whole people" does not identify the person or entity that owns
the property. Economic, social, and legal "de-personification" of
property precludes any subject--collective or individual-from
being vested with any integral interest and benefits of the owner-
proprietor.' Such a "diffusion" of the right of ownership and its
anonymous character causes confusion. Locating the owners of a
specific parcel of land in the ordinary course of business presented
a common practical problem. There is no land register analogous
to the Torrens Land Title Register in Latvia.9" Land title cannot
be assured. An administrative document, or state land certificate,
establishes the grant of the particular parcel of land for a specified
use. This document provides some indication of the purpose of
the land use, such as agricultural, or building works.99  The
person who is entitled to use the land, however, has no alienable
right to its ownership. Prior transfers of "title" or any encum-
brances on the land remain uncertain.
3. Special legal regulation of land ownership. Russian legisla-
tion clearly distinguished between the concept of ownership in
rural and urban areas, and the rights of possession and use of land
and buildings. First, land and buildings were separately
owned." Unoccupied land could not be purchased or sold, but
the building itself could be subject to any transaction.1 1 Second,
land was considered an object for agricultural production."2
96. Rozenfelds, supra note 93, at 358.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Russian law did not recognize the principal that "the possession of
land carries with it in general ... possession of everything which
is attached to or under that land." 103  For example, collective
farms did not have legal rights to natural resources and minerals
found on their lands. Thus, land ownership in Russia primarily
represents ownership of a farm for agricultural purposes. There-
fore, two independent branches of legislation existed: property law
as a part of civil law, and land law, or agricultural law.
4. Limited right to use, possess, lease, and dispose of land. The
Land Ownership Fundamentals were enacted shortly after the
Perestroika Liberation took effect." The legislation did not
mention land ownership, but it did provide the right to possess
land, and it explicitly prohibited the "buying, selling, donating and
mortgaging or unauthorized exchange of parcels of land."'' "~ The
Land Reform Law of the Republic of Russia officially abolished
the state monopoly on land and developed a system of land owner-
ship." Nonetheless, this law embodies a narrow view of land
ownership because it imposes explicit restrictions on the use,
transferability, and disposition of land. For example, according to
the Land Reform Law, parcels of land may be owned solely for
the purpose of farming, gardening, animal husbandry, and other
agricultural activities."° Thus, the term "ownership," as defined
in the Land Reform Law, is limited to farmland. The State can
seize the land if it is being used inefficiently or improperly."°
Furthermore, state agencies restrict the size of the land that may
be owned." 9
103. Hannah v. Peel, 1945 K.B. 509 (1945).
104. Floroff & Tiefenbraun, supra note 92, at 237.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 238-39.
107. Land Reform Law, supra note 106, art. 4, para. 1.
108. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
109. Id. art. 2, para. 4. The plots of land are so small-50 acres on average-that
efficient and profitable production has been nearly impossible. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra
note 70, at 1. For example, The Decision of the Sverdlovsk Region Soviet "On
Transformation the Land Under Control of the Soviet of People Deputies, Establishing
Maximum Dimensions of Land Plots for People of the Region," which was adopted on
July 26, 1990, established the following sizes for land plots: gardening-0.20 hectare;
private subsidiary, small-holding in agricultural area (farm garden attached to a
house)-up to 5.0 hectares; individual dwelling-up to 0.10 hectare. Problemi razvitiya
zakonodatelstva o zemle v Rossiiakoi Federazii [Problems of Developing Land Legislation
in Russian Federation], 8 Sov. Gos. I PRAvo 3, 9 (1993) (citing the round table of the
Journal "Gosudarstvo i Pravo"). In comparison, the average size of a farm in the United
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The Land Reform Law also restricts the sale of land by
owners or recipients of land grants. The State, as the agent that
initially grants land to individuals, is the only entity that can buy
land from an owner. Owners may only sell their land back to the
local Council of People's Deputies,"' which acts on behalf of the
State, and is obliged to buy back the land if the owner wishes to
sell it."' To avoid speculation, land granted by the state must be
held for ten years before it can be resold." 2 Nevertheless, land
presumably may be inherited when the heirs continue to work on
the land and use it according to all prior established condi-
tions."3 Finally, land may not be transferred to, or owned by,
foreign citizens."'
Significant legislative steps toward de-socialization of agricul-
tural relations in Russia occurred during the post-Gorbachev
period."5 For example, the first and most progressive measures of
capitalization in the country included: (1) allowing different forms
of farm ownership, including privately owned farms;" 6 (2) estab-
lishing citizens' rights to lease land, life-long inheritable possession,
or ownership;117 and (3) maintaining a system of registration of
land ownership.
118
Undoubtedly, the purpose of these reforms was to abolish the
longstanding monopoly on possession of collective and state farm
land and to reorganize the Russian farm system. 19 The same
traditional socialist principles, however, predetermined the course
of the legislation's development. Therefore, the reforms left
numerous issues unresolved and failed to achieve the primary goal
of diversification of land ownership." Restrictions on the
States is 190 hectares. G.B. Chubukov & A.A. Pogrebnoi, Pravo chastnoi sobstvennosti
krestianina-fermera [The Right of Private Property of a Peasant-Farmer], 7 SoV. Gos. I
PRAVO 61, 68 (1993).
110. Land Reform Law, supra note 106, art. 9, para. 2.
111. Id. art. 9, para. 3.
112. Id. art. 11, para. 3.
113. Id. art. 9, para. 2.
114. Id. art. 4, para. 3.
115. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA: TRANSLATIONS WITH EXPERT
COMMENTARY 7-6 (Mark C. Swords ed., 1994).
116. Id. at 7-4.
117. Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 92, at 235.
118. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA, supra note 115, at 7-4.
119. Id.
120. Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 92, at 235 (providing a detailed review of the
land legislation of Russia).
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purchase of land and limitations on the sale of land to anyone
other than the state still existed. Methods for transforming land
ownership rights were not resolved, and land continued to be
subject to particular farming use restrictions. Only heirs who
expressed a desire to be farmers could inherit land. If more than
one heir existed, the Counsel of People's Deputies determined
which claimant deserved the inheritance.121 Land could escheat
to the State in the absence of an heir or member of the farm to
continue the farming activity.
The rule against direct restraints on alienation is well estab-
lished, dating back to feudal times. 23 The rule was historically
used by mesne lords to block transfers of their land by tenants
without their consent. 24 Nevertheless, the economic inefficiency
of such systems is well known. U.S. legal academics note that such
restraints make property unmarketable, discourage improvements
on land, prevent the owner's creditors from reaching the property,
and "tend to perpetuate the concentration of wealth by making it
impossible for the owner to sell property and consume the
proceeds of sale."'" The effect of these restraints explains why
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's next step in the continuation of
market reforms was to allow the buying and selling of land.
The Decree of December 27, 1991 authorized individual
owners to resell land to other individuals, not just to the State, in
particular situations such as retirement, inheritance, and resettle-
ment of land for farming purposes.1 26 Removal of these limita-
tions on the resale of land greatly expanded the concept of
ownership by providing a reasonable possibility of resale.
Nevertheless, the Decree only governs agricultural lands, it still
requires new land owners to pursue specific activities on the land,
and it still prohibits the resale of land to legal entities and to
121. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RussIA, supra note 115, at 7-7.
122. Id.
123. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 95, at 223.
124. Mesne means intermediate; a mesne lord, in feudal times, was lord to those who
stood below him in the feudal ladder and tenant to those above, the tenant in chief and
the King. "A tenant in chief could be a mesne lord, but the King, standing at the top,
could not be." Id.
125. Id.
126. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii o neotlozdnikh merakh po osutchestvleniu
zemelnoi reformi v RSFSR [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Urgent
Measures for Carrying Out Reforms in Russia], translated in 22 ZAK. I EKON. 45 (1992).
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citizens for the purpose of engaging in entrepreneurial activity.12 7
Until these restrictions are lifted, the market concept of land
ownership as a subject of capital and investment will not be
achieved.
On March 25, 1992, President Yeltsin issued Decree No.
301,1" allowing individuals and legal entities to buy and own real
estate for entrepreneurial activity.1 29 The process of abolishing
old socialist restraints on alienation presents an interesting
development. The focus of Russian land legislation is changing
from subjective restrictions on the alienation of land to particular
persons to objective restrictions on the types of land that may be
privatized. The Decree specifies which categories of land may not
be sold for entrepreneurial activity. These categories include land
for public utilization within urban areas, national parks, historical
monuments, nature preserves, botanical gardens, recreation areas,
lands contaminated by hazardous materials, land under temporary
use, agricultural lands, and lands with mineral deposits 3 ° All
other types of land may be sold for the purpose of engaging in
entrepreneurial activity.
While the Decree expanded the idea of land ownership, it
should not be regarded as a guarantee of the right to buy and sell
land freely. The Decree primarily aims to resolve the existing
conflict between titles of ownership of the enterprise occupying the
land, and the titles of ownership of the land beneath the enter-
prise. The market value of a privatized enterprise did not include
the market value of the land on which it was built. Likewise, the
value of the land under the enterprise was not included in the
statutory capital of the enterprise. Obviously, any situation in
which a privatized enterprise did not own the land on which it was
erected was unattractive to prospective buyers.
The provisions for buying and selling parcels of land for
entrepreneurial activity did not actually constitute a guarantee of
free purchase of land in Russia. First, these provisions apply to
privatized enterprises, which are mostly labor-managed and have
a collective form of ownership.' 3' Second, no clear legal mecha-
127. Id.
128. Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 92, at 237.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 92, at 236-37.
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nism for the diversification of land ownership exists. 32  The
presence and power of the State remain incontrovertible because
the State regulates all matters concerning the right to purchase
land and all payments relating to the land; it controls the use of
the land, and it can seize the land.133 Because the State sells
both the privatizing enterprises as well as the land on which they
are built, it controls the process of allotting the land. Third,
restrictions on land ownership, which prevent owners from
operating efficiently, remain effective. For example, land trans-
ferred to private ownership cannot be resold for ten years, and
land bought from the State cannot be resold for five years.
1 4
Fourth, the new Russian laws do not give the owner the power to
utilize and dispose of natural resources-such as oil, gas and
minerals-that may be discovered under the land. Basically, land
is still considered the means of production but not the object of
capital investment. Finally, socio-political tension surrounding the
land ownership question cannot ensure the stability of current
legislation and the irreversibility of the privatization process.
13 5
Decree No. 1767 of the President of the Russian Federation
on the Regulation of Land Relations and the Development of
Agrarian Reform in Russia abolished the last legal restrictions on
buying and selling land on October 29, 1993.136 According to
Yuri D. Chernichenko, leader of the Farmers' Party, "without this
decree, there could be no real ownership of land., 137  This
Decree provides that "citizens and legal entities who are landown-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. KONST. RSFSR [Constitution] art. 12, para. 3; see also Ertugrul, supra note 89, at
3.
135. According to Gennady A. Zyuganov, "[iun Russia, land, air and water must belong
to all the people and not to concrete individuals." Zyuganov was a leader of the Russian
Communist Party, which together with the powerful, conservative Agrarian Party has a
strong opposition in the new Russian parliament. Zyuganov stated that individual
ownership "is against Russian historic traditions. The very nature of a Russian peasant
is against it." Efron, supra note 10, at A16. Indeed, public opinion polls have found that
one-half to three-quarters of all farmers oppose de-collectivization. Id. Yeltsin faces
serious resistance; the members of Russia's 26,000 state collective farms make up a
powerful lobby, firmly represented by the minister of agriculture. Kaplan, supra note 11,
at 1.
136. "Decree By the President of the Russian Federation on the Regulation of Land
Relations and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia," Decree No. 1767 of Oct.
27, 1993, The British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, ITAR-
TASS News Agency (World Service), available in LEXIS, News Library, Omni file.
137. Efron, supra note 10, at A16.
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ers have the right to sell, bequeath, gift, mortgage, lease, and
exchange land, and also transfer land or part of it as an investment
in the capital funds of joint-stock companies, associations and
cooperatives, including ones that have foreign investments.',
138
The primary and most important provision of the Decree is
the designation of land as a commodity and an object of capital
investment. By lifting the moratorium on sales, the Decree
removes the largest obstacle to private farming by enabling
farmers to obtain loans through mortgages. According to the
Decree, "[t]he state guarantees the inviolability and protection of
private ownership of land, and also the protection of the rights of
owners of land when carrying out transactions with land.
' 139
The Decree provides an opportunity to use land for non-
agricultural purposes. It is now possible to sell land for non-
agricultural uses, provided the owner obtains permission from
regional authorities."4 The construction of the decree by local
authorities, however, will apparently shape many practical issues.
Unfortunately, the Decree is not specific regarding changes in land
use and transformation of land for non-agricultural purposes. For
example, the Decree permits the refusal to issue a land ownership
certificate on the basis of "[a] change in land use;' 14 1 it also
establishes "compensation payments for taking agricultural land
out of agricultural use.' ' 142 Members of collective farms can sell
their allotments of land to citizens and legal entities for the
production of agricultural produce. At the same time, the
members of the collective have preference in obtaining allotments,
or shares, over other purchasers.
143
The conditions under which members of collective farms can
sell their allotment of land for non-agricultural purposes is
uncertain. Many of the terms and clauses of the Decree must still
be defined and explained. For example, it is unclear when the
State can refuse to issue a certificate of the right to land ownership
under "a change in land use" clause. Furthermore, the amount of
''compensation payments" for taking agricultural land out of
agricultural use, and the agency that determines the amount of
138. Decree No. 1767, supra note 137, art. 2 (emphasis added).
139. Id. art. 4.
140. Id. art. 5.
141. Id. art. 9.
142. Id. art. 7.
143. Id. art. 5.
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such payments is uncertain. Agricultural land is not clearly
defined. Additionally, the Decree fails to define the "preferences"
given to members of collectives, and how they can be realized.
According to Russian bureaucratic traditions, and the absence
of a true separation of powers within the government, central and
local authorities construe legal decrees. Obviously, the interpre-
tation may depend largely on the political biases of the interpreter.
For instance, comments made by the Minister of Agriculture of
Russia, Khlystin, on the implementation of Yeltsin's latest decree,
are difficult to derive from the Act itself. According to Khlystin,
"If a person received a plot of land but was not using it sensibly,
the State retains the right to confiscate the plot or to buy it out
compulsorily, even from the owner . ... [t]his land would be
transferred to the redistribution fund and could then be given to
new owners."' " One may speculate whether this statement was
the official government position or only a personal interpretation
by a public figure seeking political support. Khlystin also noted
that town dwellers who decide to move permanently to rural areas
would have the right to obtain land if they met a number of
conditions, such as "having appropriate diplomas in agriculture and
having certain agricultural skills." '45  Thus, it is difficult to
interpret the ultimate meaning of Russian laws.
Yeltsin's Decree calls for the privatization of Soviet-era
collectives and the state-farm system;14 6 as the famous Russian
economist, Pavel Bunich, stated, "the state collective farms will not
die overnight," if indeed they will die at all. 47 Unfortunately,
state decrees cannot eliminate the psychological resistance of the
Russian people to private ownership of land. One of the main
obstacles to land reforms is the individual reluctance to make
dramatic changes in society.1" In December 1991, Yeltsin's
Decree required all kolkhozes, collective farms, and all sovkhozes,
state farms, to re-register for the first time by January 1993.149
They were given the option to retain their present form, to become
144. Interview with Agriculture Minister Khlystin on Land Reforms (Moscow radio
broadcast, Oct. 27, 1993), available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
145. Id.
146. Decree No. 1767, supra note 137, art. 2.
147. Efron, supra note 10, at A16.
148. "We don't want any choice!" was the peasants' response to privatization efforts
in Nizhny Novgorod. Rubinfien, supra note 78, at A16.
149. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA, supra note 115 at 7-5.
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limited liability or joint-stock societies, or to form cooperatives or
associations.15 Ninety percent of the farmers chose to remain in
the collective sector.'51 Public opinion polls indicate that one-
half to three-quarters of all farmers oppose de-collectivization.'52
In compulsory deliveries and other forms of forced removal of
agricultural produce from collectives and state farms for state
resources has been abolished. Thus, the collectives can finally
compete with the private sector on more favorable terms. This
ability to compete creates further doubt that the collectives will
liquidate in the near future.
The abolition of collective farms, however, may not be
necessary. There may be few economic incentives to privatize.
The state may be misguided in its efforts to enforce de-collectiviza-
tion in the first place, as was the case sixty years ago. Perhaps it
is preferable to give farmers the land and the opportunity to
decide for themselves how and with whom to work. Regardless,
the new Russian law gives peasants these opportunities.
The Decree did not expressly permit foreigners to obtain land
for private ownership, but it did not prohibit it either. Most
foreign investors are interested in Russian land for non-agricultural
purposes, such as commercial or industrial uses. There are at least
three legal means by which foreign investors may buy land. First,
foreign investors can employ a Russian lawyer who forms a
Russian domestic corporation. The corporation could then sell all
shares of stock in the corporation to foreign investors. Under this
scenario, enterprises with 100 % foreign-owned assets may be
founded and operated on the Russian territory.'53 Enterprises
involving foreign investment may be created by founding a new
business or by investing in or buying an existing business."
Second, foreign investors can buy private real estate such as
building which is bought without the underlying land. The original
price of a building or enterprise upon privatization does not
include the price of the land, and the price of the land underlying
the enterprise is not normally included in the statutory capital of
150. Ertugrul, supra note 89, at 3.
151. Id.
152. Efron, supra note 10, at A16.
153. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA, supra note 115, at 7-7.
154. Id.
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an enterprise.155 Thus, the foreign investor can legally possess
and use the land without any practical inconvenience.
Third, foreigners can lease land and property on that land for
a long period of time, or lease both with an option to purchase
after the expiration of the term.
According to the Decree, landowners receive a certificate of
land ownership that is to be registered in a registration (land)
book.156 "The certificate is a document certifying the right to
land ownership and serves as the basis in transactions concerning
the purchase, sale, mortgaging, and leasing of land, and also for
other actions involving the ownership, use, and disposition of land
in accordance with existing legislation.
' 157
The Decree proclaimed that "plots of land and everything
firmly connected to them are regarded as immovable proper-
ty., 158 While it is unclear whether natural resources and minerals
are considered immovable property and, therefore, belong to the
owner of the plot, two arguments support the interpretation that
they do not. First, Article One of the Decree states that "[land
deals are regulated by civil legislation, taking into consideration
land, forest, nature conservation, and other specialized legislation
and this present decree." '59 Existing civil legislation, however,
treats natural resources and minerals as state property. Second,
the Decree itself is a source of agricultural law and is mainly
concerned with land relationships in the agricultural sphere.
Moreover, it is not clear whether "immovable property" includes
a single ownership of both the land and the real estate above it, or
only the land. If the former definition is assumed, this provision
may be inconsistent with existing Russian legislation on dwellings,
which imposes certain restrictions on buying and selling dwelling
houses in Russia.
The Decree provides that the sale of land may take place by
competitive bidding or auction."6 As a result, agriculture may
fall prey to speculators who buy all the land and keep it fallow,
awaiting higher prices for their crops. They may rent it out at
155. Id.
156. Decree No. 1767, supra note 137, art. 3.
157. Id.
158. Id. art. 1.
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 8.
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usurious rates, creating a new class of serfs. 6' With current
skyrocketing inflation and catastrophic depreciation of the ruble,
land can be bought cheaply by foreigners or individuals who might
illegally use the purchase as a means to launder money. Although
well-intentioned, the Decree may ultimately exacerbate a major
area of corruption.
Finally, the Decree is basically concerned with farm lands and
does not regulate the ownership of urban, non-agricultural lands.
Urban lands are more attractive to foreign and domestic investors.
The current Russian law does not offer a mechanism for distribut-
ing urban lands. Furthermore, the Decree is drafted in very
general terms and will subsequently require considerable interpre-
tation through acts and resolutions that may wipe out all positive
provisions of this ordinance.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM:
PROPOSALS FOR PRIVATIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF
STATE FARMING
Each society has its own special reasons for privatization. A
particular government's objectives will be primarily determined by
several factors: (1) the current socio-political atmosphere in the
country, (2) the level of prior socialization of property, (3) the
length and scope of the process of privatization, (4) distorted
economic factors and feasibility of expenses, (5) the historical
development of the economic and legal institutions in the country,
(6) the current legal system, and (7) the effects of the options
proposed. "The nature of a government's objectives have a
determinative effect on the shape of its program. It is only
possible to design a program, and assess its success, if its objectives
are clearly formulated and expressed.,
162
The underlying objective of privatization in Russia must be to
restructure the system of socialist ownership relations and to
abolish the State's monopoly on property ownership. The goal of
decentralization of the Russian economy can only be achieved by
abolishing the State's absolute dominance over the means of
production and by establishing a multi-structural and multiform
system of ownership relations. The various forms of ownership
161. Efron, supra note 10, at A16.
162. Matthew S. R. Palmer, Privatization in Ukraine: Economics, Law, and Politics, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 453, 492-93 (1991).
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reflect the diversity of economic interests. Russia cannot move
toward a market-based economy without restructuring its current
ownership relations. State ownership of the means of production
resulted in significant socio-economic distortions in the spheres of
distribution and consumption of material goods.'63 This situation
adversely affected the economic and social welfare of the Russian
people.
The implicit objective of land privatization is to encourage the
development of efficient farming. Efficiency can be achieved
through a mechanism for diversifying ownership of agricultural
land and abolishing the monopoly of kolkhozes. The present
system of kolkhozes is grossly inefficient. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that all kolkhozes must be destroyed under the new
program of decollectivization. Legislation reform should allocate
land to peasants and give them the freedom to manage that land.
Depending on the particular situation, some peasants might choose
to join their parcels of land and work together in cooperatives,
while others might decide to operate independently. This land
management freedom would achieve diversified land ownership,
encourage development of the agricultural market, and give the
peasants incentives to use their land productively.
Thus, privatization is an important element in the recon-
struction of state farming and in the transformation of the Russian
agricultural complex into a market economy. The ultimate
objective of both reconstruction and privatization is to improve the
economic and social standard of living of the Russian people.
Thus, the privatization program must be tailored to the economic,
social, political, legal, and historical conditions of Russia.
The program should reflect the current period of economic
and social transformation, and it should be applied only during this
period. Future economic changes can substantially modify the
legal principles of the program. In other words, this period of
transformation requires specific measures that must exist only
during this period, and specifically to resolve the problems of that
period. A transitional period requires only transitional law. The
notion that the system of state-owned property can be changed
into a system of privately-owned property by legislation is quite
Utopian, at least in the former Soviet Union.
163. Id.
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The key word in the definition of privatization is "transforma-
tion." Transformation means "the act or an instance of transform-
ing" or "the state of being transformed."'6' Thus, privatization
law regulates the temporary period during transformation of state-
owned property into privately-owned property, establishes the
methods of such transformation, and creates a foundation for
further development of the major institutions of property law.
There are several fundamental principles that will help shape
a Russian privatization program. Among these principles are
Russia's legal traditions, its current socio-economic tension,
possible alternatives, and feasible options.165
First, different types of state land must be allocated, employ-
ing different legal approaches to urban land and agricultural land.
The government must establish two different systems of regulation
for the distribution of urban land and farm land. The system of
privatization of urban land must be more relaxed than the system
of allocating farming or agricultural lands. The reason for such
differentiation is quite obvious-the country cannot afford to lose
all agricultural land at once. Such a loss could happen through
purchases of land for speculative purposes. Groups such as
Russian nomenklatura, and apparatchiki--or black-marketeers,
mobs, and foreigners-could take advantage of the skyrocketing
inflation and the catastrophic weakness of the national curren-
cy."6 The main objective of privatization-to provide conditions
for developing efficient farming, while eliminating inequality
among members of the community-would not be achieved. Such
a turn of events would eventually lead to a new socio-political
crisis, which could only be resolved by a new communist, national-
ist, or even fascist revolution. It has been argued that the
traditional socialist and republican hostility to speculators "is
grounded in part on the notion that they introduce a degree of
liquidity into economic relations that threatens the political
structure of the community."' 67
Thus, farming land in this transformation period must be
subjected to some restrictions on use and alienation. Without
164. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1901 (3d
ed. 1992).
165. Palmer, supra note 163, at 492.
166. Id. at 494.
167. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1343-44
(1991).
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these drastic measures, fairness and equity of distribution cannot
be achieved. Such restraints are common in nineteenth-century
reform models." s
On the other hand, urban land is much more important to the
market process. The price of urban land is dependent on the
market. The freedom to buy and sell urban land will induce broad
investments and stimulate the development of urban areas.
Furthermore, the land and structures thereon should no longer be
separately owned. The ongoing process of privatization of
enterprises, buildings, and dwellings demands the legal reformation
of basic real estate law. Urban land must be free from restraints
on alienation. Investment by foreigners, primarily interested in
urban land, can only improve socio-economic conditions, not
aggravate them.
Second, for the reasons stated above, the farm lands in the
agricultural areas must be distributed primarily for the purpose of
farming. The land should only be sold for commercial use if
nobody wishes to purchase these lands for agricultural purposes.
The government should establish a two-tiered system of bidding
for farm land. The farmers and others who wish to work on the
land may participate in the first round of auction. These buyers
would be favored by preferable terms, government credits, and
lower prices. An auction purchase might be determined not only
by the price, but also by the proposed program for the develop-
ment of the land, the participants' skills, and their knowledge and
reputation. The state committee, which would evaluate the
potential candidates and their business programs, might include
government officers, judges, agronomists, ecologists, peoples'
deputies, and farmers. The proposed land development program
could then be incorporated into the purchasing contract.
Thus, land distributed for agricultural use would have restric-
tions so that it could be used only for agricultural purposes and
not be subjected to speculation for a certain period of time. These
restrictions are quite reasonable given the significantly favorable
168. American economist Thomas Skidmore proposed a system under which property
could be held privately by the "fathers" only as a life estate. The property would then
revert to the state upon the holder's death, to be redistributed each generation to the
"children" in approximately equal allotments. PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROPERTY:
AMERICA' S FIRST ECONOMISTS 237-40 (1980). The Homestead Act of 1862 limited the
amount of public land that might be acquired to a quarter section per claimant.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 363 (1973).
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terms upon which the land was acquired. Without analyzing the
theoretical details of real estate rights, the farmers would have an
Anglo-American equivalent of a fee simple absolute, and the state
would retain a possibility of reverter,x61 or some kind of limited
ownership.170 The transfer restraint gives the state enforcement
control over the transfer of the equity interest. The constraint
may give the state a right of first refusal may require the state's
consent to sale, or may require that the buyer satisfy stipulated
conditions.
Restraints on alienation may contribute to the maintenance of
a politically desirable distribution of wealth and "preclude transfers
that might threaten the social-republican character of the commu-
nity-notably transfers to absentee owners or 'speculators.
''1 71
In fact, some U.S. colonial laws imposed either settlement
conditions on property interests in feudal grants of western lands
or usage requirements that required the owner to reside on the
property and use it productively as a condition to property rights,
or both.172  Such restraints are also prominent in twentieth-
century third-world land reform programs.
73
As the second step in the two-part bidding process, if the land
cannot be sold in the first round of the auction, the state auction
committee can recommend that the local government, as the
current owner of the land, either lease or sell the land for
commercial use. Government ordinances, through established
zoning or covenants, can also restrict the potential commercial use
of the land.
Third, land used by the collective farms must not be sold at
auctions, but instead, allocated among the members of the
collective farms themselves. Historically, collective farms were
organized by joining private farms, including land, cattle, and
agricultural implements. Because members are the successors to
the former private landowners, it seems inequitable to liquidate
kolkhozes without fair compensation to their members. Moreover,
169. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 95, at 266.
170. For a discussion of different forms of limited equity ownerships, see Simon, supra
note 168, at 27-32.
171. Id. at 1341.
172. Id. at 1342.
173. See, e.g., SIDNEY KLEIN, THE PATrERN OF LAND TENURE REFORM IN EAST ASIA
AFTER WORLD WAR II, 20-21 (1958); SusAN WALSH SANDERSON, LAND REFORM IN
MEXICO 1910-1980, at - (1984).
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public policy favors the distribution of agricultural lands to people
who are planning to farm those lands. Also, the land has far more
value to farmers than to anyone else. Therefore, the land of
collective farms should be distributed among the members. From
a practical standpoint, if the government does not give the
collective farmers some privileges with respect to acquiring the
right to their land-land that they have possessed for several
generations-the government would be unable to liquidate
kolkhozes without a Stalinist-type "implementation" of state policy
by means of force.
All members of collective farms would be entitled to a share
of the farm's land and varying shares of the fixed assets of the
farm. The size of the plot and the value of the individual's share
would depend on seniority, the length of time worked on the farm,
a coefficient of labor participation, position, and other factors.
Each person could decide whether to use his share of the land for
private farming or to pool his property with others and work
cooperatively. From a legal viewpoint, this collective land should
have relaxed requirements and fewer restrictions. The farmers
should be able to alienate their lands, but the collective and the
state should have the first right of refusal. As a practical matter,
this means that the land would not be transferrable on the
secondary market until the economic transformation has been
completed and the market has been formed.
Fourth, collective farms, as a form of state enterprise, must be
reorganized. If farmers want to work collectively, they must
organize themselves into a legal form of business association, such
as a cooperative, a partnership, or an association. These new
organizations should not be liable for the debts of the former
kolkhozes or subjected to the existing requirements of providing
compulsory supplies to the government; they should enter into
contracts with the government. These new organizations should
be given a new start. The cooperatives must be free to buy their
supplies and sell their product without administrative restrictions
on quantity or price.
Fifth, the government must provide equal opportunity and
equal treatment for all business organizations and private farmers.
For example, credit and financial assistance, if any, should be
available to everyone on an equal basis. Government subsidies
should be abolished. The so-called "[s]tations of Technical
19941
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Service, ' 174 which provided collectives with combines and
universal technical service for their transportation, must be
privatized or liquidated. Basically, the enterprises, as parts of the
chain of agricultural production, must be privatized and must
reorganize their relations on a contractual basis.
Sixth, denationalization of land in Russia to the former owners
should not be allowed. Some former Soviet republics decided to
restore land to previous owners or their heirs; 175 the Baltic states
did not become part of the former Soviet Union until well after its
formation, however. Thus, the liquidation of private property and
other changes in landowner rights in these countries occurred in
the span of one generation. Certainly, it is much easier for the
Latvian Parliament to justify and legitimize denationalization
rather than explain to the Russian people why they have to return
their property to people whose remote predecessors may have
possessed the land three generations before them. This denation-
alization is inconsistent with current Russian policy.
Seventh, there are many technical obstacles to ascertaining the
former owners of land after such a long and bloody period in
Russian history. When the Baltic States joined the Soviet Union,
the traditions of the people were vastly different from the people
of other republics. The Baltic States were forced to adopt socialist
civil law, which was quite different from their former civil legisla-
tion, particularly with regard to property law.176 After proclaim-
ing their independence, the Baltic States were able to return to
their pre-Soviet civil law, which automatically changed many legal
institutions of the Soviet legal system, including state ownership of
the means of production, without any significant problems. The
denationalization of Russian land to its former owners is not
advisable. This situation would create new political tension, social
anxiety, and legal chaos, thus jeopardizing the entire process of
economic transformation.
174. See, e.g., Rozenfelds, supra note 93, at 358.
175. Id.
176. The Soviet Latvian Civil Code was built as a Pandect system-based code. The
Code included all of the same principles that applied to the rights of ownership in other
Soviet Republics. The Civil Law of pre-Soviet Latvia was based on an institutional system
like the French Code Civil. The subsequent Soviet Latvian Civil Code of 1964 only
included about 600 articles while the earlier Civil Law of 1938 had 2,400 articles. Id. at
358.
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Finally, natural minerals such as oil, gas, gold, and copper
should not be considered private property of the land owner. Such
a rule would eliminate land speculation during the period of the
land's initial distribution and would prevent unjust enrichment to
speculators at the expense of society as a whole. A contrary
approach to this problem would provoke a "land-rush" and induce
even greater corruption of the people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Privatization is an inherently controversial issue that will
generate considerable public and political debate. "Resolution of
the substantive issues of privatization is necessary, but not
sufficient, for embarking on a program., 177 Procedural issues are
no less important, but inadequate attention to the process of
implementation may destroy the program.171 This is particularly
true in Russia. Current economic changes, political instability,
absence of clear legal doctrines and regulations, conflicts of
interests facing government officers and state enterprise managers,
corruption, and bureaucracy demand implementation of a clear
and coherent policy.
The government must control the land allocation process and
designate the subsequent use of the land. Nevertheless, privatiza-
tion should be driven by public initiatives, giving citizens the
opportunity to create their options, rather than allowing the
government to manipulate the process. The government should
play an administrative role in this process. A complete legislative
package must be introduced, covering commercial law, banking
law, bankruptcy law, securities law, real estate finance law, tax law,
administrative law, and labor law. Furthermore, the law regarding
ownership of property must be revised before privatization can
occur. The Soviet civil law, with its "absolute character" of
ownership relations, cannot provide a legal system that will
combine the economic interests of different people, entities, and
the state. The transition from a command economy to a market-
driven economy demands flexible laws that cannot only guarantee
an owner sufficient powers to effectively realize his interest in the
property, but also give society the legal means to control the
177. Palmer, supra note 163, at 510.
178. See Ed A. Hewett, Comments and Discussion, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC AcTivITy 309, 312 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1990).
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distribution of this power according to general principles of
fairness, equity, and the public interest.
